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Public involvement in setting rules and establishing regulations on transaction 
processes in market economies is absolutely necessary for markets to be efficient. But 
rules by themselves are not sufficient. To be sufficient the rules and regulations 
must be enforceable and enforced. 
The difference between a market economy and a centrally planned and controlled 
economy is not that one has rules and the other not. The rules are just different. In both 
economies there must be exchange mechanisms, marketing institutions and rules about 
how they operate. In many instances the objectives of both type economies are similar-
economic growth, full employment, and a reasonable living standard for all. In a planned 
economy the rules relate to actual production goals and quotas and the specific 
decisions about the establishment of transfer prices. In a market economy the rules 
relate to the process by which prices are discovered. Prices are discovered in the 
market place, not made. Prices become a signaling device. 
Presented at an DECO Conference on "Strategies for an Institutional Framework in the 
Hungarian Agri-Food Secto~' in Workshop Session B4"Marketing Infrastructure: The Role 
of Government in Facilitating the Development of an Efficient Market in the Agri-Food 
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In a market economy the govemment establishes rules about the marketing and 
price discovery process. In both the planned economy and the market economy, the 
government interferes in the price discovery process at the risk of an incorrect allocation 
of resources. But in a market economy, changes in market conditions are permitted to 
show up in price changes. The difference is not in what government hopes to achieve 
but in the manner that it goes about doing it. 
In the early transition period from a centrally planned economy, there appeared 
to be a strong belief that moving to a market economy meant eliminating all of the rules 
that regulate the wayan economy works; that markets would automatically evolve. 
However, without preexisting institutional arrangements that facilitate transactions, (that 
is, rules and regulations of the transaction processes between buyer and seller), chaos 
will certainly prevail. And chaos did prevail and still does in many places in the world. 
A colleague has written, "Markets are signaling mechanisms, but markets cannot 
function in a world without structures of one form or another. Markets, if they are to 
represent legitimate signalling, must function so as to hold down: (1) the costs of 
obtaining information about possible market opportunities, (2) the costs of negotiating 
contracts or bargains among market participants; and (3) the costs of enforcing bargains 
or contracts that have been struck. We call these costs transaction costs." (Bromley) 
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A useful criterion for deciding the degree of government involvement should be ­
will it hold down or reduce transaction costs. While transaction costs are being held 
down, prices must be allowed to move so as to bring forth, in the short run, the matching 
of market supplies with market demand and in the long run, an efficient allocation of 
resources. And this can be done only if transaction costs, including risk, are minimized. 
Economies in transition have a tremendous challenge in evolving the proper set 
of institutional marketing arrangements and the rules that govern their operation. 
Marketing institutions in the western world have evolved over a long period of time into 
an incredibly complex system of markets that operate under a very complex set of 
private and public rules. For the food industries of transition economies to operate in 
competition with the food industries of the western world, they must establish in a 
relatively short time, marketing institutions and rules that have transaction costs 
comparable to those in the western world. High transaction costs are as much of a 
barrier to being competitive in those markets as are the existing trade barriers. 
The Government's Role 
Areas in which the government has a legitimate role in a market economy are: 
the establishment of contract and bankruptcy law, regulating the price discovery process, 
ensuring some degree of competition, and assisting producers in the orderly marketing 
• 
of their output. I will discuss each briefly. 
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Contract Law, Grievance Procedures and Bankruptcy Law 
Each transaction in a market economy involves some agreement or contract 
between buyers and sellers, Le., the owners of goods or services that have something 
to sell and the potential owners who want to buy. Institutional arrangements whereby 
each participant can expect the other to fulfill their part of the contract must exist. In the 
case of failure to payor to deliver there must be "a procedure to redress or recover the 
lost opportunity. These laws or rules must be viewed as being just and timely. The laws 
or rules must be simple enough and the level of intervention minimal enough so as to 
hold down transaction costs. Others are more expert than I on contract law, therefore 
I will only emphasize that rules about contracts must exist and there must be a way to 
settle disputes. 
Price Discovery Processes 
In a market economy, governments should be primarily concerned about the price 
discovery process, not the level of prices. The price discovery processes, no matter the 
institutional arrangement, need to be efficient in determining the appropriate value of the 
commodity. It is important that one side of the transaction not have too much power 
over the other through controls over supplies or markets, nor access to more information 
than the other so as to unduly influence the outcome. 
-
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There needs to be rules to regulate the way buyers and sellers relate to each 
other. The rules need to be rigid yet flexible. Rigid, so that market participants, both 
parties (buyers and sellers have some confidence that transactions will be completed 
with minimum risk and at minimum cost). Flexible, in that participants have choices 
among alternative price discovery mechanisms. Flexible, so that rules can be adjusted 
to account for changes in communication technology and changes in the structure of 
institutions involved in producing and distributing goods and services. 
Rules do make a difference, but the kinds of rules that are appropriate depend on 
the type of price discovery process. I will discuss three types of exchange mechanisms 
or price discovery processes.1 They are 1) private (informal or formal) negotiations, 2) 
auctions or organized markets and 3) private or public administered prices. I caution 
that the appropriate set of institutional arrangements, the rules and enforcement 
procedures that are appropriate, are likely to be somewhat different for each country, 
depending on that society's culture and traditions. No fixed prescription for anyone 
country exists. Furthermore, the institutions and rules need to change over time to fit 
changes in marketing conditions and marketing technology. 
In what follows, I will describe the three types of exchange mechanisms and an 
appropriate government role for each. 
• 
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Private (Informal or Formal) Negotiations 
In market economies, most actual transactions are by individual negotiation. 
Buyers and sellers meet in person or by phone and agree to trade at a price. The terms 
of the transaction, including the price, might be informally agreed upon or might be in 
the form of a formal written contract. The price might be negotiated on each transaction 
or a formula for determining price might be agreed upon. For the transaction to be 
satisfactory, both parties must perceive the risk of completing the transaction to be 
minimal, and in terms of alternatives, profitable. This does not mean that both sides will 
be happy with the absolute level of price. If the market is working efficiently the absolute 
price level will be determined, in large part, by forces external to the transaction. 
In the US, the majority of transactions in the agri-food industry are by private 
negotiation. Sometimes the negotiation about price occurs on each transaction, however 
in many arrangements the transaction price is determined by formula. The basis element 
of the formula might be a price for the same or closely related commodity, that has 
been discovered through some other institutional arrangement. For this individual 
transaction to be efficient, the open market price must be efficiently discovered and 
represent all of the supply and demand forces at work in the economy. The open 
market price can be from an organized cash market (auction or central exchange) or a 
futures market. 
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A proper role of government for this type of exchange process is minimal. 
Contract law must be enforced. An information system must be established to provide 
each side of the negotiation valid and sound information about market conditions and 
prices. Direct intervention should be minimal or not existent. The information could be 
provided by government agencies, or the government could make sure that the private 
sector provides reliable information about the current supply and demand conditions and 
market (actual transaction) prices. These must be provided on a current basis, be 
relatively accurate and disseminated widely, especially to interested parties. In some 
instances, a private news service can be more effective than government. There is 
nothing certain about the government being more effective than the private sector in 
providing accurate and timely information. The decision over government versus private 
sector involvement should be made on the basis of minimizing transaction costs. 
Auctions and Organized Markets 
For most of the major agricultural commodities, organized markets are used to 
determine value or price. And in organized markets, the rules really do make a 
difference. Organized markets can come in many forms, from local auctions to large 
central exchanges. They can be face to face with the product physically present or they 
can be by contract with a remote electronic transaction system. To be efficient, the rules 
about ownership and operation of the exchanges must be specific, well known and 
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enforced. 
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. The rules can be from government or established by the private operators of 
the organized markets. Terms of trade must be specified. Charges must be minimal. 
Transaction prices must be public and widely delivered. There must be penalties for 
non-delivery of the commodity or items according to the terms of trade agreed upon. 
And the organized market must be large enough to achieve adequate economies to 
scale to reach that goal of minimizing transaction costs. As a minimum, it is probably 
necessary for the government to establish an oversight agency to make sure that the 
rules and the way the organized markets operate are in the public interest rather than in 
the interest of one side of the transaction. 
Organized exchanges in the US are almost all privately owned and operated and 
they establish their own operating rules. They are self supporting with operating revenue 
coming from user fees. The governments role is to make sure that they do operate 
according to their own rules (contract law) and that they operate according to the rules 
set down in their charter. Specific rules concern quality, grades and standards, and 
honesty in providing information. In most cases, a third party system is used to 
guarantee quality and to settle disputes. In this arrangement, the exchange will continue 
to be in business only as long as transaction costs for the commodity group are lower 
using this system than from using another system. 
• 
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Administered Pricing Mechanisms 
Where privately administered pricing arrangements exist, the government's role 
is minimal but important. To make sure that the firm or firms that have the power to post 
prices do not also have the power to develop or maintain a monopoly position in the 
market, the government needs to make sure that the buyers have options and that the 
trading field is balanced (i.e., no side of the buying or selling group has undue power 
over the other in the negotiations over price, etc). 
This can be accomplished in some cases through some form of anti-trust law. 
Ad ministered pricing in most developed countries is common on the farm input or buying 
side of agriculture. There are usually a few firms supplying the agricultural sector and 
these firms have some form of monopoly power. In some of the countries in transition, 
this firm is the government. In this situation, the government's role is probably best 
served by making sure that a private sector exists along-side the government side. This 
will provide competition and ensure that the government is operating efficiently. 
Administered pricing can involve price posting by an exchange or a private firm 
that collects market information. This means that enough information is known about the 
market that a close approximation can be made of the market clearing price. Some 
private market news services publish price quotations that are used as a basis (formula) 
• 
for pricing individual private transactions. Here the government's role should be minimal. 
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The quotation will only be used by buyers and sellers if they feel that the quotation 
properly represents market conditions at the time. Again the focus of government should 
be on making sure that buyers and sellers have options and that information is published 
and available about market conditions and actual transaction prices. 
Regulating the Degree of Competition 
The extent to which firms are competitive in a market economy, determines in 
large part, the economic efficiency of that economy. Several agri-food firms need to be 
in competition with each other in order to ensure that the prices are efficient and that 
transaction costs are kept low. To accomplish this, government needs to have some 
form of anti-trust law and/or some form of unfair trade practice law. In addition, it might 
be necessary to provide some segments of the agri-food sector an exemption, if that 
sector, even with reasonably enforced anti-trust laws, is at a competitive disadvantage. 
In the US, this type of exemption is applied to farmer owned cooperatives so that farmers 
can compete against a highly concentrated supply and marketing sector. 
Orderly Marketing 
In an open market environment, the prices of agricultural commodities are usually 
quite volatile because of the many factors, especially weather and disease factors, that 
-

cause production to vary substantially from year to year. When this is the case there is 
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a tendency for government to want to control prices. This tendency must be resisted. 
If the government or the farmers want to influence the price of their commodity, there are 
other options. One is to inl:luence the market supply by a storage policy, a flow to 
market regulation, or a demand expansion program. The government can establish 
enabling legislation for self help programs such as marketing orders that regulate quality, 
grades and standards, storage policy, research and promotion. If the industry pays for 
and manages their own programs with the enforcement power of the government, the 
programs will be sel'f policing. Whatever efforts are exercised on behalf of the producers 
will have to generate enough revenue from the market over the long run in order for the 
effort to survive. 
Closing Comments 
The criterion that would seem most useful in determining the extent of government 
involvement is as follows: Are the rules and regulations of government and private 
exchange organizations consistent with minimizing transaction costs? Are they rigid 
enough to ensure confidence and a perception of minimum risks? Are they flexible 
enough to ensure creativity in generating new exchange mechanisms and in permitting 
innovation in economic activity? 
The western world has a myriad of rules and regulations on the enforcement of 
-

contracts, protection of property rights, antitrust laws, restrictions on insider trading, 
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restrictions on cornering the market, collection and publishing of price and other market 
information, public reporting of financial data of privately owned firms, etc. to keep 
markets working efficiently. In most countries, the current rules started to evolve over 
60 years ago. And they are still evolving. 
Making agri-markets efficient involves getting the rules "right", it does not involve 
getting prices right; the market process determines the "right" price. 
• 
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